Elections and the future of peace and stability in Libya

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1

Table of Contents

Summary

Using a logistic econometric model, this paper provided estimates for the probability of conflict recurrence in Libya if elections were held at the end of the current year. The results showed that the probability of conflict recurrence in Libya appears high in this case, reaching 71%. Postponing the elections until the end of next year will not contribute much to reducing the probability of conflict recurrence. Reducing the probability of conflict recurrence requires, according to the model's estimates, to make changes in the nature of the Libyan political system so as to allow for broader political participation of the different political parties. These changes include, first, the transition to a decentralized system and the transfer of more powers and financial resources from the central government to local government units, it also includes replacing the proposed presidential system with a parliamentary system, and finally adopting a mixed electoral system to elect parliament, allowing political parties to effectively participate in elections.

Keywords: elections and conflicts recurrence, the Libyan civil war, the Libyan elections.

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the year 2011, the Libyan society has been living in a state of political instability and the prevalence of violence and armed conflict. During this period, Libya witnessed three major wars in the years 2011, 2014, 2019, and this period witnessed also the first legislative elections in 2012 and another in 2014, and two political agreements were concluded between the parties to the conflict. These were: the Skhirat agreement in 2015 and the Geneva agreement in 2020. Despite that, the state of instability and political division continued, and as a final solution to the problem of political instability and violence, the political parties agreed to hold presidential and legislative elections in December 2021, but there was no appropriate environment for holding these elections. The Libyan political parties blamed each other for the failure to achieve the elections. Despite this failure, the conflicting Libyan parties and the international community continued to declare that the solution to the political crisis in Libya and an end to the state of division, political conflict and violence lies in holding general elections in Libya. Can elections really contribute to achieving stability and peace in Libya?

Given the experiences of countries that have gone through conflicts and civil wars, it is difficult to be certain and admit that elections necessarily end conflicts and civil wars. Studies that have attempted to investigate the impact of elections on ending conflict and establishing peace indicate that there are different opinions. While some see elections as an essential component of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies, others argue that holding elections could undermine nascent democracy, lead to revival of conflict, and increase the likelihood of a resurgence of civil wars. In response to this difference in evaluating the impact of elections on conflicts and civil wars, a third party believes that the impact of the elections depends on a number of variables, perhaps the most important of which is the timing of the elections.

This paper aims to investigate the potential impact of the elections to be held in Libya around the end of this year on the Libyan conflict, by using the data of countries that experienced at least one civil conflict during the period from 1945 to 2008 to estimate a model that measures the impact of elections on the probabilities of renewed conflict , and then using the available data on Libya to arrive at estimates of the probabilities of conflict recurring as a result of holding elections according to this model.

The paper will be divided into five sections. The first section presents an introduction which contains the aim of the paper and the methodology used, the second section summarize and critically appraise the literature on the impact of elections on the renewal of conflicts, the third section presents a model for measuring the impact of elections on the conflict, and the fourth part deals with the application of the results of the

econometric model to the Libyan case and investigates the potential impact of the elections on the conflict in Libya, and the fifth and final part presents the conclusion of the paper, its results and recommendations.

2. Elections and Conflicts: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses

The interest in studying the impact of elections on violence and conflicts is mainly due to the interest in studying the nature of the relationship between democracy and violence. The interest in the relationship between elections and conflicts stems from an interest in the impact of democracy and the process of democratic transition on violence and conflicts. This is due to two reasons: the first is that the desire to gain a better understanding of the impact of democracy on violence requires an understanding of the mechanisms through which the impact of democracy on violence is transmitted. The researchers showed a special interest in elections as a variable that explains the mechanism through which the influence of democracy is transmitted. The second reason is that holding elections represents one of the most important, if not the clearest, aspects of democracy, as elections play a central and pivotal role in all definitions of the democratic system, meaning that the process of democratic transition necessarily requires elections[1].

Accordingly, the various arguments and hypotheses about the impact of elections on conflicts are mainly derived from the arguments and hypotheses related to the impact of democracy on conflicts. The following is a brief presentation of these arguments and hypotheses.

2.1. Democratic Peace

This hypothesis believes that the transition towards democracy and holding elections would reduce the motives for violence and spread peace between countries, meaning that the democratic transition prevents international wars as well as reduces the motives for violence within a single state and thus reduces tensions and civil conflicts[2].

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[1] L. Cederman, G. Kristian, and H. Simon, ''Elections and Ethnic Civil War'', *Comparative Political Studies*, 46, no. 3, (2013): 387-417.

[2] L. Cederman, S. Hug, and L. Krebs, "Democratization and civil war: Empirical evidence", *Journal of Peace Research*, 47, no. 4, (2010): 377–394.

The democratic peace hypothesis is based mainly on Babst's remarks[3], who pointed out to the remarkable absence of wars between democratic countries, that is, countries that adopt a democratic system tend to settle their succession by peaceful means, which led some to believe that spreading democracy will lead to spreading peace in the world.

The democratic peace hypothesis has been expanded to also include the ability of democracy to achieve internal peace within one country. The democratic system can be seen as a conflict management system in which different and conflicting interests converge and peaceful solutions are established for them. Democracy, therefore, provides an alternative framework to violence for expressing grievances and settling these grievances, thus eliminating the motives for resorting to violence in society[4].

In addition to the above, the electoral process plays a pivotal role in the hypothesis of democratic peace, as the proponents of this hypothesis argue that elections make governments subject to accountability and evaluation by citizens, and this pushes governments to deal effectively with their demands and grievances and find acceptable settlements for them to continue in power, and therefore there is no justification or incentive for people to resort to violence and violent opposition[5]. When the existing government fails to deal, in acceptable way, with the demands and grievances of the citizens, it can be replaced by a better government through elections, meaning that elections provide a peaceful solution to the problem of the transfer of power.

The democratic peace hypothesis has made holding elections one of the tools for building peace in post-conflict societies, where in addition to the aforementioned ability of elections to settle the problem of peaceful transfer of power and its role in reducing the justifications for resorting to violence, elections can be viewed as a means to legitimize the conflict ending agreements[6].

2.2. The Dark Side of Democracy

The proponents of this hypothesis believe that the process of democratic transition creates an environment that allows the emergence and spread of exclusionary national and

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[3] D.v. Babst, "Elective Governments—A Force for Peace." *The Wisconsin Sociologist,* 3, no. 1, (1964) :9—14.

[4] N. Gleditsch, H. Hegre, and H. Strand, "Democracy and Civil War," in *Handbook of War Studies III*. (University of Michigan Press: 2008).

[5] P. Collier and D. Rohner, "Democracy, development, and conflict." *Journal of the European Economic Association,* 6, no. 2-3, (2008): 531-540.

[6] P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom, "Post-conflict risks." *Journal of Peace Research,* 45, no. 4, (2008): 461-478.

ethnic polarizations and tendencies, which leads to the emergence of violent conflicts, whether civil conflicts within the same country or conflicts between countries[7]. This hypothesis is based on Huntington's observations about the process of democratization and the attendant increase in the demand for political participation by the masses of citizens and the inability of the state's political institutions to absorb this increase[8]. These observations are known as the Huntington gap, and the proponents of this hypothesis believe that this gap leads to the outbreak of conflicts and resorting to violence in the framework of democratic transition, where the competing elites for power in the context of mobilizing citizens behind them seek to provoke ethnic, tribal or regional tendencies and prejudices of the social groups and communities that they belong to and seek to create invented opponents from other groups in society and increase the level of tension and divisions within society, and if this is accompanied by the weakness of state agencies and institutions, the state will be unable to prevent these elites from using societal polarization in order to achieve their interests[9].

The weakness of state agencies and institutions also means that there are no effective mechanisms that prevent any ethnic or regional group from using these institutions for their benefit at the expense of other groups in society. This would intensify the competition between different groups for control of state agencies and institutions through access to power[10]. This frantic competition between the various groups raises great concern and fears for their fate and interests, which may lead to the adoption of violence as a means to protect the group against the dangers that accompany the process of democratic transition and the elections it entails[11].

The proponents of this hypothesis believe that when the elites face a decline in people's desire for political participation and become unable to mobilize them behind it, these elites will resort to building power centers that are often armed and mobilize a group of supporters through the use of favoritism, opportunism and intimidation. In this environment, electoral competition can easily turn into violence and conflicts. Strong factions may see elections as a means to consolidate their influence and authority and to legitimize this authority, thus pushing for elections, while weaker factions fear that they will lose the elections, be crushed and marginalized, and may resort to violence to prevent the

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[7] D. Mansfield, and J. Snyder, "Democratization and war." *Foreign affairs,* 74, (1995): 79-97.
[8] P. Huntington, *Political order in changing societies*. (Yale University Press: 1968).

[9] J. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. (New York: W. W. Norton: 2000)
[10] B. Weingast, "Constructing trust: the political and economic roots of ethnic and regional conflict." In (ed.) V. Haufler, K. Soltan, *Institutions and social order* (University of Michigan Press:1998): 163-200.

[11] J. Fearon, "Commitment problems and the spread of ethnic conflict." in (ed.) D. Lake and D. Rothchild, *The international spread of ethnic conflict,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1998), 107– 26.

elections. Violence may also erupt when one of the factions rejects the results of the elections if it believes that the winner will seek to cling to power and exploit the legitimacy of the elections to establish a dictatorial regime[12].

2.3. Post-Conflict Election Hypotheses

Differing positions on the impact of democracy in general on conflicts are also reflected in the different arguments about the impact of elections on the chances of success in peacebuilding or the renewal of conflicts in the post-conflict phase.

2.3.1 Early Elections

Those who hold this view rely on the hypothesis of democratic peace, and they demand the necessity of expediting the holding of elections immediately after the end of the conflict in order to take advantage of the effects of elections and democracy that enhance peace. The holding of elections and the adoption of a democratic system will lead to peaceful settlements of political differences, and as long as elections are capable of doing so, it is preferable to expedite them. The acceleration of elections after the end of the conflict helps spread democratic values, provides peaceful ways for political participation in society, provides the opportunity for the emergence of moderate elites who believe in the peaceful transfer of power and legitimizes the new authorities, as well as accelerates the exit of international peacekeeping forces and all forms of foreign military presence imposed by the dynamics of the conflict[13].

2.3.2. Postponing the Elections

Supporters of this view believe that given the negative effects of the elections on stability and conflicts, it is preferable to delay them for a period of time that would allow the completion of building state institutions after the conflict has stopped, and that elections should not be rushed because this may threaten stability and the fragile peace and cause a return to conflict again. The opinion is based on the assumption that holding elections early would empower elites and leaders who were involved in the conflict, and marginalise moderate elites and pragmatic leaders, and that holding elections before building state institutions and ensuring the principle of the rule of law would make the

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[12] E. Mansfield and J. Snyder, *Democratization and civil war*. Vol. 5. (Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies: 2008).

[13] P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom, "Post-conflict risks." *Journal of Peace Research,* 45, no. 4, (2008): 461-478.

election process vulnerable to violations, which prompts some contestants to follow undemocratic methods to win it or to invoke these violations by not accepting its results if they lose it, or even obstructing it, and preventing its establishment if they expect to lose it. All of this would threaten the fragile stability and threaten a return to conflict again, and therefore supporters of this view prefer to postpone the elections for a while to strengthen the capabilities of state institutions, especially those related to the rule of law and maintaining order, such as judicial institutions, courts and the security sector, and raising professionalism Government administration and the media sector[14].

3. Elections and Conflicts: Econometric Models and Statistical Evidence

Theoretical differences about the impact of elections on the chances of renewed conflict are reinforced by differences in the experiences of countries that suffered from internal conflicts after they held elections when the previous conflict stopped and those countries which did not witnessed renewed conflicts after the elections.

Table No. 1 presents a list of some countries that did not witness a renewal of conflict after the elections. This table also presents the period of conflict prior to the elections and the date of the elections. Table No. 2 presents a list of some countries in which the conflict renewed after the elections. The large number of cases in the two tables makes it difficult to assert that there is a clear decisive impact of the elections that will be true in any case. One study counted all the elections that took place after the end of the conflicts from 1944 to 2008, and found that out of 136 electoral processes that took place after the end of a conflict, the conflict did not renew in 72 of them, i.e. approximately 53%, while the conflict was renewed in 64 cases after the election (47%)[15]. In other words, it can be said roughly that the probability of the conflict recurring after the elections is approximately equal to the probability of not renewing it, and therefore it is not possible to rely only on the data presented in Table No. 1 and No. 2 to determine the impact of holding the elections on the renewal of conflicts, and that other variables must be entered in the analysis in order to test the impact of elections on renewed conflict.

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[14] B. Reilly, ''Post-conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers.'' *International Peacekeeping*, 9, no. 2 (2002): 118–39. and E. Mansfield and J. Snyder, "Exchange: The Sequencing "Fallacy"", *Journal of Democracy*, 18, no. 3(2007): 5–9.

[15] D. Brancati and J. Snyder. "Time to kill: The impact of election timing on postconflict stability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 57, no.5, (2013): 822-853.

Table 1. A list of some countries where the conflict did not renew after the elections.

No.	Country	Conflict's period	Election date
1	Ethiopia	1978-1991	21/6/1992
2	Argentina	1975-1977	30/10/1983
3	Paraguay	1947-1947	15/2/1948
4	Bosnia	1992-1995	30/6/1996
5	Peru	1980-1996	11/10/1998
6	El Salvador	1979-1992	20/3/1994
7	Senegal	1989-1999	27/2/2000
8	The Philippines	1950-1952	10/11/1953
9	The Philippines	1972-1992	25/3/1993
10	Congo	1998-1999	10/3/2002
11	Morocco	1975-1991	16/10/1992
12	United Kingdom	1971-1998	25/6/1998
13	India	1984-1993	27/4/1996
14	Georgia	1992-1994	5/11/1995
15	Djibouti	1991-1994	19/12/1997
16	Rwanda	1997-2002	25/8/2003
17	Zimbabwe	1983-1987	28/3/1990
18	Syria	1979-1982	10/2/1985
19	Sierra Leone	1997-2001	14/5/2002
20	Tajikistan	1992-1997	6/11/1999
21	Oman	1971-1975	10/4/2003
22	Guatemala	1978-1996	7/11/1999
23	Guinea Bissau	1998-1999	28/11/1999
24	Vietnam	1960-1975	25/4/1976
25	Cyprus	1974-1974	20/6/1976
26	Croatia	1992-1995	29/10/1995

Table 2. A list of some countries in which conflict has renewed after the elections.

No.	Country	Conflict's period	Election date
1	Ethiopia	1976-1988	21/06/1992
2	Argentina	1955-1955	23/02/1985
3	Sudan	1963-1972	22/09/1972
4	Congo	1993-1997	10/03/2002
5	Democratic Congo	1960-1965	01/11/1970
6	Yemen	1948-1948	27/02/1971
7	Indonesia	1953-1953	29/09/1955
8	Indonesia	1990-1991	09/06/1992
9	Angola	1975-1991	29/09/1992
10	Angola	1992-1994	05/09/2008
11	Afghanistan	1996-2001	09/12/2004
12	Uganda	1978-1979	06/12/1980
13	Uganda	1990-1992	28/03/1994
14	Pakistan	1973-1977	25/02/1985
15	Burundi	1972-1972	22/10/1983
16	Burundi	1988-1988	01/06/1993
17	Burundi	1988-1988	01/06/1993
18	Bolivia	1946-1946	05/01/1947
19	Chad	1980-1994	02/06/1996
20	Chad	1994-1997	20/05/2001
21	Georgia	1991-1992	11/10/1992
22	Rwanda	1990-1993	29/03/1999
23	Rwanda	1994-1994	29/03/1999
24	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	14/02/1980
25	Sierra Leone	1991-1996	14/05/2002
26	Sri Lanka	1971-1971	21/07/1977
27	Sri Lanka	1983-2002	02/04/2004
28	Guatemala	1966-1972	03/03/1974
29	Cyprus	1963-1967	25/02/1968
30	Cambodia	1970-1975	20/03/1976
31	Korea	1948-1949	30/05/1950
32	Colombia	1948-1966	17/03/1968
33	Kenya	1963-1967	22/08/1968
34	Lebanon	1958-1958-	12/06/1960

35	Liberia	1992-1997	19/07/1997
36	Myanmar	1948-1951	12/06/1951
37	Nigeria	1967-1970	31/08/1977
38	Nicaragua	1978-1979	04/11/1984

As a result of the different theoretical hypotheses about the impact of elections on the renewal of conflicts, a group of researchers recently tried to use statistical models to measure the effect of holding elections on the renewal of conflicts. The experiences of different countries were used to test theoretical hypotheses and explain the variation in the experiences of these countries.

Statistical models also enable us to predict the outcome of elections in a country on the chances of renewed conflict and whether it is appropriate to hold elections or not if the goal is to avoid renewed conflict in this country.

The literature survey on the subject of measuring the impact of elections on the renewal of conflicts shows that there are three basic studies that used statistical models to measure the impact of elections on the renewal of conflicts. The first study is the Flores and Nooruddin study, which was published in 2012[16], and the second study is the Brancati and Snyder study, which was published in 2013[17]. And the third study is the Keels study, which was published in 2017[18].

Table No. 3 presents a summary of the aforementioned studies. Looking at the table and as a general conclusion, it can be said that the results of previous statistical studies generally confirm that delaying elections reduces the chances of renewed conflicts, and that if elections are accompanied by a set of measures, such as international intervention and the adoption of arrangements for power sharing, the chances of renewed conflict resulting from holding the elections can be reduced.

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[16] T. Flores and I. Nooruddin, "The effect of elections on postconflict peace and reconstruction", *The Journal of politics,* 74, no.2, (2012): 558-570.

[17] D. Brancati and J. Snyder, "Time to kill: The impact of election timing on postconflict stability", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 57, no.5, (2013): 822-853.

[18] E. Keels, "Oil Wealth, Post-conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61, no. 5, (2017): 1021-1045.

Table 3, Summary of previous studies.

Study	Flores and Nooruddin	Barancati and Snyder	Keels
Study aim	Testing the effect of holding elections on the renewal of conflicts. In these tests, the focus was on the effect of two factors, namely the extent of the maturity and solidity of democratic institutions in the country and the timing of elections.	Measuring the impact of holding elections on the renewal of conflicts.	Examine the role of oil wealth in influencing the nature of the relationship between the elections and the chances of renewed conflicts.
Study hypothesis	Countries that have mature democratic institutions prior to conflict have a greater chance of avoiding renewed conflict after elections compared to countries that are new to democracy. Delaying elections for a sufficient period of time to allow building the institutions of democracy can help a country avoid renewed conflict after elections.	The impact of elections on the renewal of conflicts depends on the characteristics of the country in which the elections are held and holding elections does not always lead to an increase in the risks of renewed conflicts.	The presence of oil wealth in a country will increase the chances of renewed conflict when elections are held.
Model used	Duration Model	Logistic regression model	Peace spells model
Study period	1960-2002	1945-2008	1946-2005
Dependent variable	The number of years that elapse from the end of the conflict until the achievement of economic recovery or the return of the conflict again, whichever occurs first.	A binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the conflict is renewed after the end of the previous conflict and takes a value of 0 if the conflict is not renewed.	Peace fails, which takes a value of 1 when the conflict is renewed and 0 if it does not
Post-conflict election variable	A binary variable that takes a value of 1 if elections occur during the recovery period, and 0 if elections do not occur.	Timing of the elections (the number of months that passed from the date of the end of the conflict to the date of the elections)	Post-conflict elections (binary variable), election timing (the period since the end of the previous conflict and the holding of the first post-conflict

			elections). The second election (any additional elections that took place after the first election in the post-conflict period). Oil elections (elections that take place in countries that have oil wealth).
Independent variables	The level of per capita income, the nature of the conflict in terms of whether it is secessionist or not, the duration of the previous conflict (number of years), the level of economic damage (the difference between the level of per capita income before the conflict and its level after the end of the conflict), the way in which the conflict ended (a decisive military victory for one of the parties or Not), the number of UN peacekeeping forces, the amount of foreign aid that the country receives after the end of the conflict	The outcome of the previous conflict (a decisive military victory for one side or not), the effect of the end of the Cold War (a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the conflict occurred during the post-Cold War period (after 1989), and a value of 0 during the period from 1945 to 1989), The duration of the conflict, measured by the number of months during which the previous conflict lasted, the number of conflicts the country witnessed in the past, the intervention of the United Nations (binary variable), the level of participation in power, and the model includes three types of forms of participation in power, the degree of participation in the executive authority, the degree of participation in Legislative power, the degree of participation of local authorities in comparison with the central authorities,	The level of democracy, the result of the previous conflict (a decisive military victory for one of the parties or not), the type of the previous conflict (ethnic or not), the nature of the conflict (a secessionist conflict or not), the duration of the conflict (the time period that the previous conflict lasted), the number of victims of the previous conflict, Power Sharing This variable measures the extent to which there are special arrangements for sharing political power or military leadership between rebel groups and

		the level of democracy, the level of economic development.	the government, peacekeeping forces.
Study findings	early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence of violence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.	Delaying the elections reduces the chance of renewed conflicts. The risks of renewed conflict due to elections are lower in countries that adopt decentralization. The risks of renewed conflict due to elections are lower in countries in which the United Nations intervenes	The elections that take place in the oil-producing countries contribute greatly to the renewal of conflicts in these countries. Delaying the elections reduces the chances of renewed conflict, and that the elections are accompanied by a set of measures such as international intervention and the adoption of arrangements for power-sharing can reduce the chances of renewed conflict

4. Elections and Conflicts in Libya

Before delving into estimates and measuring the potential impact of the upcoming elections on stability in Libya and the chances of renewed conflict, it seems appropriate to provide a quick survey of the history of elections and conflict in Libya, which helps in interpreting the results that will be provided by the standard model for estimates of the likelihood of conflict recurring in Libya and the role of elections in this.

4.1. Founding Election Violence

The first general elections were held on February 19, 1952, to elect the country's first parliament after declaring its independence on December 24, 1951. These elections witnessed strong competition, especially in the Tripolitania region, between the candidates of Tripolitanian parties such as the National Congress Party and the Free National Bloc on the one hand, and government candidates on the other hand. The competition between the two parties focused on the future of the federal system, which was approved by the National Assembly in 1950 as a political pattern to organize the affairs of the country's administration. The Tripolitanian parties launched a large electoral campaign and mobilized the masses of voters in particular in the regions of Tripolitania in favor of the orientations of these parties rejecting the federal system[19].

The position of the Tripolitania parties in particular and the Tripolitanian elite in general on the federal system was not new. During the period of preparing the constitution, and when the National Assembly approved the federal system and the constitutional monarchy as a system of government for the country, both the National Congress Party and the Free National Bloc Party considered the National Assembly to be illegal and rejected the federal system[20]. The Tripolitanian parties' position on the National Assembly's decision is an extension of the conflict between the political elites in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania over the relative participation in the country's leadership and management of its affairs, which accompanied the national action for the country's independence during the forties of the last century, when the Tripoli political elite was pushing for the establishment of a republican system for the state uniform (simple), as they believed that they had the right, by virtue of the demographic, numerical and qualitative superiority of Tripolitania over the other two regions (Cyrenaica and Fezzan), to play a leading role in the leadership of the

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[19] Mustafa Bin Halim, Libya: The Rise of a Nation and the Fall of a State, (Al-Jamal Publications: 2003), p. 220

[20] A. Baldinetti, *The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial legacy, exile, and the emergence of a new nation-state*, (Routledge, 2010), p. 140.

country and the conduct of its affairs and to enjoy greater influence and authority in it. The Tripolitanian parties rejected an equal footing with less numerous and less developed regions within Libya[21].

The Tripoli parties saw in the elections an opportunity to correct the injustice that had befallen them by adopting the federal system and aspired to win a majority in the new House of Representatives that would qualify them to change it to the simple united state system. Therefore, they launched a large electoral campaign and was expecting to win these elections, but the results of the elections were not in their favor, which led these parties to believe that the government had tampered with the elections in rural areas and ensured the victory of its candidates at the expense of the Tripolitanian parties' candidates. This belief led to the parties' demonstrations and protests denouncing the fraud. With the results of the elections, these protests quickly turned into riots, as government headquarters in Tripoli were attacked and transportation and communications were disrupted. The government responded to these actions violently through the police, which resulted in the death of 17 people, the injury of about 210 others, and the arrest of 300 people. The security forces also raided the headquarters of the National Congress Party and arrested its leaders. Finally, the leader of the party, Mr. Bashir Al-Saadawi, was deported to Egypt[22].

The first elections and the accompanying violence and the government's decision to dissolve political parties and organizations shattered the Libyan political life in its infancy and dealt a severe blow to the future of the nascent democracy in the country[23].

4.2. National Congress Elections and Re-election Violence

On July 7, 2012, Libya witnessed multi-party elections for the first time in its history in decades, and despite local and international praise for the freedom and integrity of these elections and the high turnout in them[24], the success was hiding behind a high levels of dispute and tension that could have led to a wave of violence had it not been for the actions adopted by the National Transitional Council at the time, which contributed to pacifying or postponing this violence[25].

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[21] H. Metz, *Libya: a country study*, (Area handbook series, 1989) PP. 36-37

[22] B. Oyeniyi, *THE HISTORY OF LIBYA*, (Greenwood: 2019), P 93.

[23] A. Baldinetti, *The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial legacy, exile and the emergence of a new nation-state,* (Routledge: 2010), P 143.

[24] D. Vandewalle, "Libya's uncertain revolution" in Peter, Cole and Brian McQuinn (ed.), *The Libyan revolution and its aftermath* (Oxford University Press: 2015): 17-30.

[25] . Pack and H. Cook, "The July 2012 Libyan Election, and the Origin of Post-Qadhafi Appeasement", *Middle East Journal*, 69, No. 2, (2015) :171-198

Differences began to emerge when the National Transitional Council adopted on August 3, 2011 a road map outlining the features of the transitional phase and drafting the country's permanent constitution through the Constitutional Declaration. The differences between the political elites in the east and west of the country erupted over the proportional representation of the representatives of the historical regions in the body entrusted with drafting the permanent constitution, and there is a great similarity between this period and the period of preparations for independence.

The council's attempt to pass the law on January 20, 2012, despite the opposition of the eastern elites, led to the outbreak of violence in Benghazi, and armed demonstrators stormed the headquarters of the National Transitional Council during a meeting of its members to approve the law, and the council was forced to postpone the adoption of the law.

The geographical distribution of seats was not the only contentious issue about the National Congress Election Law. There was another dispute, albeit much less severe. Some observers recorded a disagreement over the distribution of seats between parties and independents. Islamic organizations pressed towards allocating a large proportion of seats to parties. This is so that tribal and regional tendencies would not dominate the electoral process, while other parties feared that allocating a large percentage of seats to parties might eventually lead to the Islamists and their parties dominating the conference. This dispute led to a reduction in the seats allocated to parties from 136 out of 200 seats, a ratio of approximately 81%, to only 80 seats, or 40%[26].

Despite the size of the objections to the electoral law, the elections were held on schedule, and the electoral process took place without major violence in most parts of the country, with the exception of some cities in the east of the country such as Benghazi, where a helicopter was shot at transporting materials and equipment to the High Electoral Commission. This led to the death of a UNHCR employee, and Tobruk witnessed limited violence. In Ajdabiya, a UNHCR warehouse was burned[27].

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[26] J. Pack and H. Cook, "The July 2012 Libyan Election, and the Origin of Post-Qadhafi Appeasement", *Middle East Journal*, 69, No. 2, (2015) :171-198.

[27] I. Martin, "The United Nations' Role in the First Year of the Transition", in   in Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (ed.), *The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015): 127-152.

4.3. House of Representatives' Elections and the Second Civil War

The period prior to the 2014 House of Representatives elections witnessed an increase in the levels of political tension and violence in the country. Two armed alliances emerged, Operation Dignity in the east of the country, which includes many traditional and tribal forces, politicians from non-Islamist currents and professional military, while Operation Dawn in the west of the country included many Islamic political forces and armed revolutionary formations. Each operation had its extensions in the west and east, respectively. The country was witnessing a mixture of political, regional, tribal and religious conflict, which was summed up in the end in the outbreak of armed confrontations in the country[28]. The results of the House of Representatives elections exacerbated this conflict which turned into a second civil war, as the Libya Dawn coalition rejected the election results and considered them unconstitutional and refused to hand over power to the elected House of Representatives and revived the National Congress and formed a government for national salvation in the west of the country, while the House of Representatives began its work In the east of the country and formed a transitional government.

4.4. Upcoming Elections: Is Violence Coming?

To predict the impact of the proposed elections in Libya on the probabilities of renewed conflict, we first need to estimate a model that shows the relationship between elections and the chances of renewed conflict, then we use this estimated model to predict the possible outcomes of several scenarios for holding elections in Libya, these scenarios will identify the elements of risk associated with holding elections and clarify ways and options available to mitigate them.

The paper will use the model used in the Brancati and Snyder study because it is more suitable for the purposes of the paper, as the model provides a framework for a clear link between the timing of elections and the renewal of conflicts, and allows taking the effect of other variables which are closely related to the objectives of the study, such as choosing the type of electoral system, and therefore it will be used to predict the impact of the upcoming elections on the future stability in Libya and the chances of renewed Libyan conflict.

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[28] D. Gartenstein-Ross and N. Barr. "Dignity and dawn: Libya's escalating civil war." *International Center for Counterterrorism Research paper: (*Netherlands: 2015).

4.4.1. Econometric Model

The model used in this study attempts to determine the factors affecting the renewal of conflicts and civil wars after the end of a conflict and a previous civil war, meaning that the dependent variable in this model is the event of renewed conflict, and it is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 in the event of renewed conflict and values of 0 in the event of no renewal conflict, and this variable will be denoted by the symbol *NWar*.

The explanatory variables that the model proposes as explanatory variables for the renewal of conflicts and wars can be divided into four categories:

The first category includes the post-conflict elections variable, which means the first elections to be held at the national level[29] after the end of the conflicts. The elections variable is related to the impact of the timing of the elections, which is measured by the number of months that have passed since the date of the end of the previous conflict and the date of the first elections at the national level and will symbolize it with the symbol *Elect*. It is expected to be an inverse relationship between this variable and the dependent variable, meaning the longer the elections are delayed, the fewer the chances of renewed conflicts.

The second category includes a set of variables that describe the characteristics of the previous conflict. The first of these variables is related to the period in which the conflict occurred. This variable differentiates between the conflicts that occurred during the Cold War period and the conflicts that occurred after the end of the Cold War. The conflict period variable is also a binary variable, taking a value of 1 to describe the conflicts that occurred after the end of the Cold War, and a value of 0 to describe the conflicts that occurred during the Cold War. It is expected that there will be an inverse relationship between this variable and the dependent variable, meaning that there is less chance of renewed conflicts that occurred after the end of the Cold War compared to the conflicts that occurred before its end, due to the absence of the impact of the aid that the conflicting parties can obtain locally from both sides of the Cold War.

The second variable within this group is related to determining the way in which the previous conflict ended, and it is also a binary variable that differentiates between conflicts that ended with a decisive military victory for one of the parties and those that ended with a peace and settlement agreement. It takes a value of 1 if the conflict ended with a decisive victory for one of the parties, and a value of 0 if it ended with a peace and settlement agreement, and it is expected that there will be an inverse relationship between this variable

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[29] The model does not take into account local elections.

and the chances of renewed conflict, as conflicts that end with a decisive victory for one of the parties often tend not to renew conflicts.

The third variable within this group measures the impact of the intensity of the conflict by measuring the number of times the conflict has recurred in the past, that is, this variable represents the number of conflicts and civil wars that the country has witnessed in the past. Literature suggested that intensity of previous conflicts increase the chances of the renewal of the conflict, it is therefore expected that the relationship between this variable and the dependent variable will be direct, and this category of variables is denoted by the symbol *PreWar*.

The third category of the variable is related to measuring the impact of international intervention in the conflict, and the model differentiates between two types of intervention, the first type is related to intervention through peacekeeping missions and includes multiple forms, including sending peacekeeping forces, mediating between the conflict parties and sponsoring peace talks and settlement between the conflicting parties, monitor the implementation of peace agreements etc. This variable distinguishes between conflicts in which the United Nations intervenes and conflicts that do not interfere in it, as it takes a value of 1 for conflicts in which the United Nations intervenes and a value of 0 for conflicts in which the United Nations does not intervene, and the relationship is expected to be inverse between this variable and the chances of renewed conflict. The second type of international intervention is represented in the aid provided by the United Nations to support the holding of post-conflict elections. This variable is also a binary variable, and it is expected to have an inverse relationship with the chances of renewed conflict. This class of variables will be denoted *UN*.

The third category of variables is related to the description of the political system in which the elections are held. This category attempts to measure the impact of the level of power sharing provided by the political system in the country. It is expected that the greater the degree of political participation allowed by the political system for the different parties in the country, the less chances of renewed conflict, and this category will be denoted by the symbol *PS*.

This category includes three types of variables, the first type is related to the electoral system of the legislative authority, as this type differentiates between three systems for electing the legislative authority, the first system is the Proportional Representation (PR) system, the majority / plurality system, and the mixed electoral system, which combines the two systems. The impact of the electoral system will be measured through a Cardinal Categorical Variable, and by virtue of the tripartite nature of this variable, a binary variable of the proportional representation system will be included, taking a value of 1 when the

country uses this system and 0 otherwise , another variable for the mixed system will be included which will take a value of 1 if the country adopts the mixed system and 0 otherwise, the majority system will not appear in the model to avoid the Perfect Multicollinearity Problem when estimating the model, it will be considered as a reference variable , that is, the variable against which the effects of the other two variables are measured. In general, it is expected that the relationship will be inverse between the variable of the mixed system and the chances of renewed conflict, because this system gives greater opportunities for participation in power compared to the majority system.

The second type of variables that measure the level of participation in power is related to the nature of the political system of the executive authority, and this variable measures whether the country adopts the presidential system or not, and takes a value of 1 if the country adopts the presidential system and 0 otherwise, and the relationship is expected to be direct between this variable and the dependent variable, because the presidential system narrows the chances of sharing power compared to the parliamentary system, for example, where the executive authority is concentrated in the hands of one person who is the president, while the parliamentary system provides a better opportunity for the participation of multiple parties in the executive authority.

The third type is related to the system of the state form adopted by the country, where decentralized systems provide a greater scope for participation in power compared to centralized systems, and this variable takes a value of 1 if the country adopts a decentralized system and 0 otherwise, and the system is defined as decentralized if it allows the election of leaders of local authorities and it grants at least one of the following powers to the local authority, either legislative powers, financial powers, or executive political powers, and it is expected that the relationship will be inverse between this variable and the chances of renewed conflict.

The fourth category is related to measuring the level of democracy in the country, and the level of democracy is measured through the Polity IV index, which ranges between -10 for fully dictatorial countries and +10 for fully democratic countries, and the relationship between this variable and the chances of renewed conflict is expected to be an inverse relationship, and this variable will symbolize with the *demo* code.

From the above, the standard model can be formulated as follows

$$NWar = \alpha + \beta_1 Elect + \beta_2 PreWar + \beta_3 UN + \beta_4 PS + \beta_5 Demo + e \qquad \rightarrow(1)$$

The previous model is a model of a binary dependent variable that takes a value of 1 in the event of renewed conflict and 0 in the event of non-renewed, that is, the dependent variable **NWar** is binary and therefore the usual regression model cannot be used to estimate it, as this model will not be bound by the duality of the dependent variable and can produce expectations greater than 1 or less than 0, so the model should be converted to another formula that takes this constraint into account. One of the most common methods used to measure such a model is called Logistic Regression Model. The logistic regression model enables us to estimate Model 1 in a way that preserves a binary constraint of the dependent variable. A logistic regression model will be used to estimate the previous model.

To estimate the model, data from 77 countries that fought at least one civil war from 1945 to 2008 will be used. The data compiled by Brancati and Snyder from various sources[30], and the Libyan data included in the forecasting process compiled by the researcher.

It should be noted that although most of the variables affecting the chances of renewed conflict were included in Model No. 1, it cannot be claimed that the model did not overlook some important variables that were not included in the model due to the difficulty of obtaining data about them, for example, despite the importance of the foreign interventions it is difficult to obtain reliable and published data on the size and timing of such interventions, which prompts researchers not to include them in the standard models related to the study of wars and civil conflicts despite their importance. Another example of the impact of the lack or deficiency of data such as not including some important variables in the models of renewed conflicts and civil wars is explained by the variables related to some institutional aspects such as the rule of law, corruption, the efficiency of government administration ... etc., despite the importance of these variables, they were not used in models of renewed conflicts due to the lack of historical data about them, as data on these variables have been available only since the mid-eighties of the last century, and the inclusion of these variables in the models leads to a significant decrease in the size of the study sample, which negatively affects the results of estimating the model, and therefore they are not included.

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[30] D. Brancati and J. Snyder. "Time to kill: The impact of election timing on postconflict stability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 57, no.5, (2013): 822-853.

4.4.2. Estimation Results

Table No. 4 presents the results of the measurement of Model No. 1, for the purposes of clarification, and also to test the sensitivity of the estimated and adopted model in the prediction process, the model was measured in four stages, each stage included successive additions of the independent (explanatory) variables.

As can be seen from the table, the first Model1 presented in the second column of the table included the election timing variable in addition to the category of variables that determine the characteristics of the conflict, the **post-cold era**, the outcome of the previous conflict (**Victory**), the number of conflicts and **previous civil wars**.

Table 4. Model estimation results.

Explanatory Variables	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4
Election timing	*0.01-	*0.01-	**0.01-	**0.01-
	(1.74-)	(1.88-)	(2.06-)	(2.19-)
Post-cold war era	***1.95-	***2.13-	***2.59-	*2.38-
	(3.75-)	(3.28-)	(2.60-)	(1.89-)
Victory	0.04	0.62-	0.96-	1.14-
	(0.07)	(0.89-)	(0.89-)	(0.91-)
Previous civil wars	***0.49	**0.46	*0.40	0.32
	(2.57)	(2.28)	(1.75)	(1.35)
UN intervention		***1.64-	**2.32-	**2.54-
		(2.64-)	(2.00-)	(1.76-)
UN assistance		0.83	1.30	1.48
		(1.21)	(1.38)	(1.27)
PR system			0.32	0.66
			(0.54)	(1.03)
Mixed system			1.39-	0.34-
			(0.92-)	(0.33-)
Unitary executive system			0.93	0.91
			(1.41)	(1.37)
Decentralization			***3.06-	***3.32-
			(4.26-)	(3.99-)
Polity IV				0.03-
				(0.56-)
Constant	0.12-	0.64	2.60	2.77
	(0.22-)	(0.95)	(1.58)	(1.50)

Pseudo R2	0.155	0.195	0.402	0.406
Wald test	18.65	23.71	35.87	37.85
Log pseudolikelihood	56.49-	53.80-	39.99-	36.18-
No	105	105	105	94

z-values reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

The results show that the explanatory power of the model as a whole is acceptable at a confidence level of 99% as indicated by the Wald test, the result also shows that the election timing variable is acceptable at a confidence level of 90% as indicated by the value of the Z-test shown in parentheses, the value of the estimated coefficient, the sign of the negative election timing variable coefficient indicates the inverse relationship between the timing of the elections and the chances of renewed conflict, meaning the more delayed elections are held after the end of the previous conflict, the less chance of conflict renewal.

The coefficients of the variables describing the previous conflict are all compatible with the expectations of the model, where the negative sign of the coefficient of the variable post-Cold War conflicts indicates that the conflicts that occur after the end of the Cold War have less chance of renewal, the positive sign of the coefficient of the variable number of previous wars shows that the greater the intensity of the previous conflicts, the more The chances of renewed conflict increased, the results also show that the variable is acceptable at a confidence level of 99%, the variable of the outcome of the previous conflict has a positive sign, which is a result that violates the assumptions of the model, but it is not statistically acceptable, as indicated by the low z-test value.

The third column in the table presents the model estimation results after adding the category of variables related to the UN intervention. Which shows the lower chances of renewed conflict in the conflicts in which the United Nations intervenes compared to those that do not intervene, and this effect is acceptable with a confidence rate of 99% as evident from the value of the Z-test, the coefficient of the UN aid variable has a positive sign contrary to the expectations of the model, but it is not acceptable statistically, adding the variables of international intervention did not affect either the direction of the relationship between the election variable and the category of variables describing the previous conflict on the one hand, and the chances of renewed conflict on the other hand, and its transactions are still maintained at the same level of confidence as before[31].

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[31] The inclusion of other variables in the forms of assistance provided by the United Nations, such as assistance in monitoring, regulation and auditing, did not give better statistical results, meaning that they did not improve the explanatory capacity of the model, and therefore they were not presented in Table 4.

The fourth column in the table shows the results of adding the category of variables related to the description of the political system, and as it is clear from the table, the adoption of the PR system leads to an increase in the chances of conflict compared to the adoption of the majority system, while the adoption of the mixed system leads to a reduction in the chances of renewed conflict Compared with the majority system, but their effect is not statistically acceptable. The results also show that the adoption of the unitary executive system leads to an increase in the chances of renewed conflict, but its effect is not statistically acceptable. It is visible from the negative sign of the coefficient of the variable, the value of the Z-test shows that this effect is acceptable at a confidence level of 99%, the ability of the model as a whole to explain is still acceptable at a confidence level of 99% after adding the variables describing the political system, as it is clear from the value of the Wald test, It is worth noting that the level of confidence in the election variable has increased and is now acceptable at the level of 95%.

The last column in the table shows the addition of the democracy index variable Polity IV to the model. The coefficient of the democracy variable is not compatible with the model's assumptions, but it is not statistically acceptable, yet the model as a whole is still acceptable at the 99% confidence level, and the election variable is still acceptable at the 95% level.

In general, it can be said that the explanatory power of the model as a whole is statistically acceptable, and that the election variable is also statistically acceptable and that its acceptance is not sensitive to the different descriptions of the model. These results qualify us to use the model to predict the impact of elections in Libya on the chances of renewed conflict.

4.4.3. Elections and Opportunities for Renewed Conflict in Libya

The estimated model in the fifth column of Table No. 4 can be used to predict the impact of holding elections in Libya on the chances of renewed conflict, and it can also predict the impact of different scenarios for holding elections on the chances of renewed conflict, Table No. 5 presents these scenarios, and the possibilities have been calculated that accompany each scenario by using the values of the Libyan variables assumed by each scenario in the estimated model in the fifth column in Table No. 3[32].

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[32] To clarify the method of calculating the probability we use the assumptions of scenario No. 1, where the scenario assumes that elections will take place at the end of December 2022, and since the ceasefire was signed in Libya on October 23, 2020, this means that 36 months have passed between the date of the ceasefire and the date of the holding the elections, any election timing variable will take a value of 36, and the Cold War variable has a value of 1, and the outcome of the war variable takes a value of 0 because the war ended with a settlement and not a decisive victory for one of the parties, the variable number of previous conflicts takes a value of 3, the 2011 conflict, the 2014 conflict, and the conflict In 2019, the United Nations variables will take a value of 1 because the United Nations is involved in the conflict and provides assistance to conduct elections in Libya, and since the electoral law approved by the House of Representatives on October 5, 2021 adopts a majority system, the proportional representation system variable takes a value of 0 as well as the system variable Mixed, and since the law on the election of the executive authority approved by the House of Representatives on September 8, 2021 adopted the presidential system, the value of the executive power variable takes a value of 1, with regard to decentralization, the applicable law is the law of local government issued by the General National Congress on July 18, 2012, and it is noted that this law has not yet been fully implemented, as the country has not been divided into governorates according to the law. In addition, the law did not grant financial, legislative or executive powers of a political nature to the local governing units. Thus, the decentralization variable takes a value of 0, the Polity IV indicator gives measures the level of democracy in Libya as equal to 0, and according to these values and assumptions, the equation of the estimated model becomes as follows: Logit NWar=2.77+-0.01×36+-2.38×1+-1.14×0+0.32×3+-2.54×1+1.48×1+0.66×0+-0.34×0+0.91×0+-3.32×0+-0.03×0=0.9116084

The probability of renewed conflict is calculated as follows:

$$PNWar = 1 = 11 + e(-0.9116084) = 0.71$$

27

Table 5. Scenarios of the impact of elections on the possibility of renewed conflict in Libya.

No.	Elections scenario	The possibility of renewed conflict
1	Elections to be held on December 31, 2022	71%
2	Elections will be held on December 31, 2023	69%
3	Elections will be held on December 31, 2023, with a proportional representation system	81%
4	Elections will be held on December 31, 2023, with mixed system	61%
5	Holding elections on December 31, 2023, with the adoption of the parliamentary system	47%
6	Holding elections on December 31, 2023, with the adoption of the mixed system + the parliamentary system	39%
7	Holding elections on December 31, 2023, with the adoption of decentralization	7%
8	Holding the elections on December 31 with the adoption of decentralization + mixed system + parliamentary system	2%
9	Calculating the odds of renewed conflict as a result of the July 7, 2012 elections	13%

The first scenario, this scenario assumes that the elections will be held at the end of the current year without making any other changes in the conditions for holding the elections. According to this scenario and as shown in Table No. 5, the probability of renewed conflict is very high, reaching 71%, if the elections are postponed until the end of the next year according to the second scenario, will reduce the probability very slightly from 71% to 69%. It is clear from the first and second scenarios that the possibilities of renewed conflict with the prevailing conditions governing the electoral process in Libya seem to be very high, and that relying on postponing the elections will not change much in the chances of renewed conflict, and therefore, we should think about the latest changes in the conditions and requirements that govern the electoral process. The third scenario, which includes holding elections at the end of 2023 with changing the Parliament Election Law and adopting the proportional representation system instead of the majority system prevailing now according to the Parliament Elections Law issued by the House of Representatives on October 5, 2021 would increase the odds of renewed conflict from 69% to 81%.

The fourth scenario shows that postponing the elections until the end of the year 2023 and adopting the mixed system in the parliament elections instead of the majority system can reduce the possibility of renewed conflict from 69% to 61%, while the fifth scenario assumes the postponement of the elections until the end of the year 2023 with the change of the regime from presidential to Parliament elections in the sense of canceling the law on electing the president or keeping it, but with making the president's competencies only honorary and the prime minister being appointed by the House of Representatives. The adoption of a parliamentary system instead of a presidential system with the postponement of the elections to the end of the year 2023, the sixth scenario indicates a decrease in the probability of renewed conflict to 39%.

The seventh scenario assumes the postponement of the elections and the change of Local Government Law No. 59 issued by the National Transitional Council on July 18, 2012 so that local units are given real powers, either financial, executive, political or legislative so that the local government system in Libya becomes a decentralized act, in which case the possibility of conflict will decrease. It becomes 7%. If the change of the local government law is combined with the change of election laws, decentralization and the mixed system are adopted and the presidential system is replaced by a parliamentary system, according to what the eighth scenario assumes, the probability of renewed conflict in Libya drops to 2%.

The previous scenarios show that the chances of renewed conflict in Libya in the current situation appear to be very high, and that postponing the elections will not do much to avoid the recurrence of conflict in the country. The scenarios also show that the country's legislative authorities can spare the country the risks of renewed conflict by introducing legal amendments that would increase the margin of political participation for the various political parties and forces in Libya, through the adoption of a decentralized system that transfers real powers to local authorities and reduces the intensity of competition for central authority. Also, the transition from the presidential system to the parliamentary system would allow a broader spectrum of political forces to participate in power instead of concentrating it in the hands of one person and thus one political current, which leads to alleviating the conflict over the executive authority and thus avoiding renewed conflict. Similarly, the mixed system that allows political parties and blocs that have perceptions and projects at the national level to compete effectively for participation in power, it would also contribute to avoiding a new conflict in the country.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper aimed to investigate the potential impact of holding elections in Libya on the chances of renewed conflict in it. To achieve this goal, the paper used the estimates of a logistic econometric model to estimate the possibilities of renewed conflict in Libya. The results of measuring the model and the predictions derived from it showed that the probability of renewed conflict in Libya appears to be very high if the elections are held at the end of this year and reaches 71%. The results also showed that postponing the elections until the end of next year would not significantly reduce the possibility of renewed conflict. Reducing the probability of renewed conflict requires, as the model predicts, changes in the political framework in which it will take place. For the elections to succeed a political system should be adopted that allows a broader participation of the various Libyan parties in the power that will be produced by these elections. At the forefront of the changes comes the amendment of Law 59 on local government in a way that decentralization is activated and grants broader powers to local government units as well as greater financial power for local authorities, followed in importance by the shift from a presidential system that concentrates executive power in the hands of one person to a parliamentary system that allows multiple parties to participate in the central executive power, and the shift from a system of majority election in the House of Representatives to a mixed system would allow the organized political forces and parties to participate effectively in the elections, which contributes to raising the margin of political participation for the parties.

The model estimates that if all of these amendments are adopted together, the probability of renewed conflict in Libya will drop from 69% to only 2%, assuming the elections are postponed until the end of next year.